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Our civil liability system affords numerous defenses against eve-
ry single violation of the law. Against every single claim raised by the
plaintiff, the defendant can assert two or more defenses, each of which
gives her an opportunity to win the case. As a result, when a court er-
roneously strikes out a meritorious defense, it might still keep the de-
fendant out of harm's way by granting her another defense. Rightful
plaintiffs, on the other hand, must convince the court to deny each
and every defense asserted by the defendant. Any rate of adjudicative
errors-random and completely unbiased- consequently increases
the prospect of losing the case for meritorious plaintiffs while decreas-
ing it for defendants. This prodefendant bias forces plaintiffs to settle
suits below their expected value. Worse yet, defendants can unilateral-
ly reduce the suit's expected value and extort a cheap settlement from
the plaintiff through a strategic addition of defenses. We uncover and
analyze this problem and its distortionary effect on settlements and
primary behavior. Subsequently, we develop three alternative solu-
tions to the problem and evaluate their pros and cons.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under our civil liability system, a plaintiff's entitlement to recover
remedies pursuant to the defendant's wrongdoing is qualified by multiple
defenses. The system allows defendants not only to deny the alleged
wrongdoing, but also to raise one or more defenses that reduce or com-
pletely eliminate the plaintiff's entitlement to a remedy.' Put simply,
against every single talking point raised by the plaintiff, the system allows
the defendant to raise and pursue two or more talking points that give
her an opportunity to win the case. The system thus gives defendants a
serious opportunity advantage over plaintiffs.
For example, a plaintiff suing the defendant for a breach of contract
makes one critical talking point: "The defendant breached the agreement
that she and I have made." The defendant, for her part, can counter this
talking point by asserting performance or, alternatively, fraud, misrepre-
sentation, mistake, unconscionability, or another defense.2 Because the
defendant needs to succeed on only one of her talking points out of sev-
eral, she has more opportunities to win the case than the plaintiff.3
In tort actions, things are no different. There, in addition to denying
the plaintiff's allegation, "the defendant acted negligently and caused me
damage," the defendant can assert assumption of risk, avoidable conse-
quences, and comparative negligence defenses.4 If she succeeds on just
1. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(b)(3), (c), (d)(3) (permitting defendant to deny plaintiff's allegations in
general or specifically and raise, in addition, multiple affirmative defenses that can be "as many ... as
[he] has, regardless of consistency"); see also Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 187,250 (2013) ("Most states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
2. See, e.g., William V. Dorsaneo III & C. Paul Rogers III, The Flawed Nexus Between Contract
Law and the Rules of Procedure: Why Rules 8 and 9 Must Be Changed, 31 REV. LIG. 233, 241-59
(2012) (analyzing the effect of the breach/defense structure of contract law on the rules of pleading);
David A. Hoffman & Alexander S. Radus, Instructing Juries on Noneconomic Contract Damages, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 1221, 1253 (2012) (stating that adjudication of contract disputes proceeds along
"consequential issues of interpretation, material breach, and defenses").
3. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ragghianti Founds. III, LLC v. Peter R. Brown Constr., Inc.,
No. 8:12-cv-942-T-33MAP, 2014 WL 103457, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2014) (noting that defendant
raised the following defenses in response to a breach of contract allegation: "(1) Prior Breach; (2)
Payment; (3) Conversion of Termination for Default; (4) Setoff; (5) Estoppel; (6) Failure to Mitigate;
and (7) Barment").
4. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1204-09
(2001) (describing the wrongdoing/defense structure of tort liability); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Inevi-
table Accident in Classical English Tort Law, 43 EMORY L.J. 575, 578 (1994) ("The structure of classi-
cal tort liability was thus determined by two principles-a principle of responsibility and a principle of
excuse."); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 971
(2010) ("[Tort law] plausibly identifies different forms or classes of wrongings, subject to different def-
initions and defenses.").
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one of those talking points, she wins the case. Hence, tort defendants,
too, outscore plaintiffs on talking points.' And, as we demonstrate in the
pages ahead, all other areas of the law give defendants the same struc-
tural advantage.6
The defendants' talking points advantage would be of no conse-
quence if our courts 7 were omniscient. But courts, like all human run sys-
tems, make mistakes.' The defendants' talking points advantage conse-
quently translates into a greater immunity against courts' errors. When a
court erroneously strikes out a meritorious defense, it might still keep the
defendant out of harm's way by granting her another defense. A rightful
plaintiff, for her part, must convince the court to deny each and every de-
fense asserted by the defendant. By erroneously granting one of the de-
fendant's many defenses, the court dooms the plaintiff's meritorious suit.
As a result, the plaintiff's chances of losing the case undeservedly are
much higher than the defendant's. Any rate of adjudicative errors-even
if random and completely unbiased-increases the prospect of losing the
case for meritorious plaintiffs while decreasing it for defendants, both
rightful and opportunistic. This structural bias is unintended and has
hitherto gone unnoticed. We propose to remove it from our laws.'
Consider, for example, a suit for $1,000,00010 in tort damages in
which the defendant disputes the alleged negligence and raises the con-
tributory fault defense." After analyzing the evidence and applicable le-
gal rules, the plaintiff forms an estimate that she should prevail on both
issues, subject to the omnipresent possibility that the court will reach a
mistaken decision on one of those issues. The plaintiff also estimates
that, in a case like hers, the court's probability of making an erroneous
ruling on negligence or contributory fault is about twenty percent. For
any such plaintiff, the expected judgment consequently equals $640,000
(80% x 80% x $1,000,000). If the plaintiff is rational, she would accept
$640,000 in exchange for the removal of her unquestionably meritorious
suit against the defendant. Hence, the prodefendant bias of our legal sys-
tem reduces the value of the plaintiff's suit by $360,000 ($1,000,000-
5. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Ruch, 940 F. Supp. 2d 338, 340 (E.D. Va. 2013) (noting that
defendants responded to plaintiffs negligence complaint by asserting "a number of affirmative de-
fenses, including failure to state a claim, invalid assignment, contributory negligence, and lack of prox-
imate causation").
6. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
7. In this Article, "court" refers to both judges and jurors.
8. See infra notes 13-14, 54 and accompanying text.
9. Criminal law falls outside the scope of this Article. We note, parenthetically, that the prob-
lems we discuss here rarely arise in the criminal context because criminal defendants are vastly disad-
vantaged in plea bargaining. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extraju-
dicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow
of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463 (2004).
10. For simplicity, we focus throughout this Article on the suit's expected value net of the plain-
tiff's litigation expenses.
11. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 199, at 494-98 (2001) (stating and explaining the
conditions under which a plaintiff's contributory negligence dooms her suit).
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$640,000).12 The plaintiff is forced to accept this cheap settlement because
the defendant has two talking points, while she has only one.
Consider now a defendant who faces a similar suit. The defendant
estimates that the suit is unmeritorious and that she should prevail on
both issues-once again, subject to the probability that the court will
reach a mistaken decision on either negligence or contributory fault. The
defendant also estimates that, in a case like this, the court's probability of
making a mistaken decision on each issue is about twenty percent. For
any such defendant, the expected judgment equals $40,000 (20% x 20%
x $1,000,000). The prospect of adjudicative error thus increases the de-
fendant's expected payout ($0 in the absence of error) by only $40,000. If
the defendant is rational, he would refuse to pay the plaintiff more than
$40,000 for the suit's removal. The defendant achieves this relatively fa-
vorable outcome due to her talking points advantage: she has two alter-
native claims and she only needs to succeed on one of them to win.
This prodefendant bias is pervasive and its implications can be quite
dramatic. Our example is illustrative. There, an identical prospect of ad-
judicative error reduces the plaintiff's optimism about her suit by thirty-
six percent, while reducing the defendant's optimism about his defense
by only four percent. For the deserving plaintiff, this means that the
wrongdoer can extort from her up to $360,000 in a settlement agreement.
The deserving defendant, on the other hand, can only be extorted to pay
the plaintiff up to $40,000 for the removal of the unmeritorious suit.
This structural bias does not exist merely in theory. Recent empiri-
cal studies have demonstrated that trial courts err in defendants' favor
far more often than they err in favor of plaintiffs.1 Our discovery of the
structural prodefendant bias explains this phenomenon.1 4 Defendants
have at their disposal far more talking points than plaintiffs and, hence,
they fare much better than plaintiffs when courts make mistakes.
Our system's prodefendant bias gives rise to bad consequences. It
pressurizes plaintiffs to accept cheap settlements that reduce defendants'
liability. This reduction motivates prospective violators to discount the
penalties accompanying the applicable rules of primary behavior. Those
rules consequently fail to secure individuals' conformance with the so-
cially desirable conduct. This outcome is unfair" as well as detrimental to
society's welfare.
12. For simplicity, we assume throughout this Article that parties are risk-neutral. Our analysis
will not change when parties are risk-averse. For people's different attitudes toward risk, see RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (8th ed. 2011).
13. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, Why Do Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased Trial
Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?, 15 AM. L. & ECoN. REV. 73, 93 (2013) (reporting a
study estimating that "trial courts . . . ma[de] errors adverse to plaintiffs in fully 40.5% of cases, while
they are estimated to make errors adverse to defendants in only 13.1% of cases").
14. Cf id. at 105 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothe-
sis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. EcON. S92 (1997)) (suggesting a possible selection effect
brought about by entrepreneurial plaintiffs who can prosecute risky suits at a low cost).
15. See Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1020 & n.44
(2010) (positing that a fair system of civil procedure ought to secure a roughly equal allocation of the
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Thus far, legal scholarship has paid no attention to this prodefend-
ant bias. This Article is the first to identify this bias, to analyze its causes
and consequences, and to show how to fix it. We propose three solutions
to the problem: procedural, compensatory, and substantive. After devel-
oping these solutions, we identify their virtues and vices and show how
they vary across different areas of the law.
The procedural solution eradicates the defendants' talking points
advantage by modifying the extant system of pleadings and trial. Specifi-
cally, it prohibits defendants from simultaneously denying the alleged vi-
olation and claiming a defense. Under this regime, for every cause of ac-
tion asserted by the plaintiff, the defendant will have to stick to a single
and factually coherent line of defense.
The compensatory solution remedies the imbalance between the
plaintiffs' and the defendants' legal burdens by adjusting monetary
awards. Specifically, it introduces a damage multiplier that offsets the de-
fendants' talking points advantage. This multiplier would increase the
compensation amount recoverable by plaintiffs that prevail in the trial.
By making trial more attractive for plaintiffs, this solution tempers the
defendants' extortionary motivation in settlements."
The substantive solution tackles the problem directly: it substitutes
the malfunctional violation/defenses system of civil liability by a compre-
hensive comparative fault regime. Under this regime, parties' responsi-
bility for damages and unperformed agreements will correspond to their
faults. These faults will range between zero percent and one hundred
percent, and parties will be free to make any claim about these percent-
ages. The number of talking points that plaintiffs and defendants will de-
velop against each other will consequently be equal. Courts' errors will
thus no longer be skewed against the plaintiffs. Instead, they will be
spread more or less evenly across parties' talking points.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we analyze the defend-
ants' talking points advantage. In Part III, we specify the resulting un-
fairness and erosion of welfare. In Part IV, we present our solutions to
the problem and examine their pros and cons. A short Conclusion fol-
lows.
risk of error between plaintiffs and defendants); William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in
Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1884 (2002) (arguing that rules of civil procedure should
"provide competing parties comparable procedural opportunities in a given lawsuit").
16. Another measure that one might consider in this connection is to require unsuccessful de-
fendants to reimburse the plaintiff for her litigation expenses. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4) (authorizing
judges to obligate a party whose claim was found frivolous to pay his opponent's litigation expenses,
including "reasonable attorney's fees"). This measure, however, will be ineffectual because a defend-
ant's expected gain from adding more defenses will virtually always exceed the expected Rule 11 pen-
alty by a significant amount.
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II. THE PRODEFENDANT BIAS
A. Violation vs. Defenses
Our tort and contractual liability systems employ a dual mechanism
of violations and defenses." This mechanism defines violations very
broadly to create a liability presumption against actors whose conduct
falls into the "violation" category. Conduct categorized as a "violation"
in torts includes actions that cause damage to another person due to the
actor's failure to take the requisite precautions to prevent the relevant
harm." In contract law, "violation" includes an actor's failure to perform
her promise to another person.'9 The liability presumption is rebuttable:
an actor whose conduct falls into the "violation" category is granted an
exemption from liability upon showing that she acted under certain ex-
onerating conditions or circumstances.2 0 These conditions and circum-
stances form numerous "defense" categories.21
Consider tort liability first. As a general rule, an actor engaging in a
risky activity must take adequate precautions against damage to another
person. 2  To be adequate, these precautions must be commensurate with
the probability and magnitude of the damage." Under the economic
formulation, when precautions capable of preventing the damage cost
less than the expected damage, the actor must take them.24 Failure to do
so would make the actor negligent and presumptively responsible for
compensating the victim for the ensuing damage.25
The actor's liability would still be merely presumptive, rather than
definite, because the victim's own fault may remove it.26 Accidents always
involve two or more parties with different opportunities to avoid or miti-
17. For torts, see DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 198-202, at 493-510 (juxtaposing the negligence
claim against contributory and comparative fault defenses) and id. §§ 203-04, at 510-14 (juxtaposing a
negligence claim against the "avoidable consequences" defense). For contracts, see ALLAN E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.1, at 223-24 (3d ed. 1999).
18. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 110, at 257-59 (outlining the elements of the negligence stand-
ard and its violation).
19. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, I 8.1, at 517-19.
20. For torts, see DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 198-204, at 493-514. For contracts, see
FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 8.1, at 517-19.
21. See DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 198-204, at 493-514. For contracts, see FARNSWORTH, supra
note 17, §§ 4.12, at 250-55, 4.15, at 260-64, 4.16, at 265-66, 4.18, at 270-73, 4.20, at 273-76, 4.28, at 307-
16, 8.2, at 519-25, 9.2-9.9, at 619-67; see also infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
22. See DOBBS, supra note 11, §H 143-44, at 334-40.
23. Id.
24. This formulation follows Judge Learned Hand's famous decision in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See DoBBS, supra note 11, § 145, at 340-43 (outlining the
Hand formula); POSNER, supra note 12, at 213-17 (outlining, refining, and operationalizing the Hand
formula).
25. The same analysis will apply to strict liability for defective products that has a similar viola-
tion/defenses format. See DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 352-57, at 968-87 (for violation); id. § 369, at 1020-
26 (for defenses).
26. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 219 ("Since, as every pedestrian knows, many accidents can be
prevented by victims at lower cost than by injurers, the law must be careful not to impair the incentives
of potential accident victims to take efficient precautions.").
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gate the damage. 27 These opportunities vary from one case to another. In
some cases, the injurer is best positioned to avoid the victim's damage. In
other cases, the victim's ability and opportunity to avert or mitigate her
own damage make her the cheapest damage avoider?5 Consequently,
there are circumstances in which the law assigns the victim's damage, or
part thereof, to the victim.29
Such circumstances may be present before, during, or after the acci-
dent. The victim may get involved in the accident by deliberately putting
herself in harm's way. The injurer would then be able to assert "assump-
tion of risk" as a categorical defense against liability.30 The victim may
also unintentionally fail to take reasonable precautions against her own
damage. This failure would allow the injurer to raise yet another categor-
ical defense: "contributory negligence.""1 Alternatively, the injurer might
be able to claim "comparative negligence"-a defense that would allow
him to reduce his compensation duty by the victim's share in her own
damage. 32 Finally, when the victim "sleeps on her damage" and allows it
to aggravate into a greater harm, the injurer would often be able to de-
feat her suit by invoking the "avoidable consequence" defense.33
This architecture of liability defines the contracts system as well.
Contract law imposes liability for acts or omissions deviating from the
actor's agreement with another party.34 The actor's failure to perform the
agreement allows the aggrieved party to recover remedies that include
compensation and specific performance.
As with torts, liability for a breach of contract is presumptive rather
than categorical. Contract law recognizes numerous defenses that forgive
or even justify nonperformance. Those defenses include misrepresenta-
tion, 36 mistake,37 impossibility,' frustration of purpose, 39 unconscionabil-
ity,4 0 fraud,41 conditions,42 undue influence,4 3 and economic duress." They
27. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 182-90 (2004) (ana-
lyzing allocation of the burden to take precautions for bilateral accidents).
28. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
68-94, 135-73, 244-65 (1970) (developing "the cheapest cost avoider" method for minimizing the cost
of accidents).
29. See DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 198-204, at 493-514 (specifying the circumstances under which
the responsibility for an accident goes to the victim).
30. Id. H§ 213-15, at 541-50 (outlining the "assumption of risk" defense).
31. Id. § 199, at 494-98 (outlining the "contributory negligence" defense).
32. Id. §§ 201-02, at 503-10 (outlining the "comparative negligence" defense).
33. Id. H§ 203-04, at 510-14 (outlining the "avoidable consequences" defense).
34. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 1.1, at 3-5.
35. Id. §12.2, at 760-61 (outlining contract remedies).
36. Id. § 4.15, at 260-64 (outlining the misrepresentation defense).
37. Id. §§ 9.2-.4, at 619-37 (outlining the defense of mistake).
38. Id. H 9.5-.6, at 637-52 (outlining the impossibility defense).
39. Id. §§ 9.7-9, at 652-67 (outlining the defense of frustration).
40. Id. § 4.28, at 307-16 (outlining the unconscionability defense).
41. Id. § 4.12, at 250-55 (outlining the fraud defense).
42. Id. § 8.2, at 519-25 (outlining the "conditions" defense).
43. Id. § 4.20, at 273-76 (outlining the undue influence defense).
44. Id. H§ 4.16, at 265-66, 4.18, at 270-73 (outlining the economic duress defense).
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are supplemented by laches, 45 limitations,4 6 and other defenses. 47 The
same violation/defenses system of liability is present in other areas of the
law as well."
As we explained in the Introduction, this system severely discrimi-
nates against plaintiffs while favoring defendants. Under this system,
plaintiffs have only one talking point and no fallbacks: in each and every
lawsuit, the plaintiff must specify and subsequently prove the defendant's
violation of the applicable legal rule or standard. 49 This talking point may
include alternative factual accounts, but the plaintiff must stili establish
the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 0 When she
fails to establish the defendant's violation, the court must dismiss the
suit.
Defendants, on the other hand, have two or more claims, or talking
points, at their disposal, with each of those claims backing up the other.
Defendants are allowed to choose between denying the alleged violation
and asserting a defense." Importantly, they are also allowed to do both: a
defendant can deny the alleged violation while asserting one or more de-
fenses.52 Defendants, consequently, have a fallback that plaintiffs do not
have. Similarly to plaintiffs, defendants can support any of their lines of
defense by alternative factual accounts. While furnishing this support,
defendants, like plaintiffs, must avoid perjury." Unlike plaintiffs, howev-
er, defendants are allowed to move from one talking point to another be-
cause their claims are substitutable. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have no
such flexibility: When a plaintiff fails to substantiate her violation claim
against the defendant, her suit falls apart. Moreover, the defendant may
45. See SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, 25 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 67.21, at
255-58 (4th ed. 2002) (outlining the laches defense); see also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Ex-
press Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) ("Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of
laches ... are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.").
46. See, e.g., Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms
Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 498-504 (2013) (discussing the relationship between
contracts and statutes of limitations).
47. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ragghianti Founds. III, LLC v. Peter R. Brown Constr., Inc.,
No. 8:12-cv-942-T-33MAP, 2014 WL 103457, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2014) (featuring defendant
who raised seven additional defenses against breach-of-contract allegations).
48. This system is a salient characteristic of our intellectual property law. See Gideon Par-
chomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1491-1512 (2013)
(analyzing the violation/defenses structure of intellectual property law).
49. Sometimes a plaintiff will have two or more causes of action: for example, she may complain
about multiple breaches of the same agreement. The defendant then would normally be able to assert
multiple defenses against each cause of action.
50. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.3, at 111 (5th ed.
2012) (outlining the preponderance requirement for plaintiffs).
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)-(c) (allowing defendants to deny the plaintiff's allegations and raise
a defense).
52. See id. at 8(d)(2)-(3) (allowing parties to assert alternative claims and defenses even when
they are mutually inconsistent).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (federal prohibition of perjury); Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex
Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1765-67 (2005) (attesting that perjury prohibitions are cast
in very broad terms and extend to virtually any false testimony).
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raise multiple defenses against any violation claim asserted by the plain-
tiff. Defendants consequently have a serious talking points advantage
over plaintiffs.
In a world in which courts make no mistakes, this advantage would
be inconsequential. When a plaintiff is correct in saying what she says
about the defendant's violation, the infallible court would figure it out
and find the defendant liable. Conversely, when a defendant is innocent,
the court would find no violation on her part and exonerate her. By the
same token, when a defendant is entitled to a defense, or to a number of
defenses, the court would figure it out as well. Put simply, when courts
make no mistakes and truth is the only coin of the realm, talking points
do not matter.
Error-free courts, however, are unreal. In the real world, courts
make a sustained effort to avoid errors, but do not always succeed. Their
errors are manifold.5 4 Judges occasionally misinterpret the law, give ju-
rors wrong instructions, admit inadmissible evidence, and exclude evi-
dence that should go into factfinding. For their part, jurors sometimes
draw wrong conclusions from evidence and fail to follow judges' instruc-
tions about burdens of proof and other legal rules. These errors lead to
54, Courts' errors result from factual and legal uncertainties and from the scarcity of decision-
making resources. Courts systematically experience shortages of information regarding what the rele-
vant facts are and what applicable legal rules say. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW
34-35, 73-106 (2005) (analyzing the sources of uncertainty in fact-finding); ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006)
(describing judicial ascertainment of the law as "choice under uncertainty" that implicates "limited
information and bounded rationality"). Consequently, they have to make their decisions under condi-
tions of uncertainty. STEIN, supra, at 34-35; VERMEULE, supra, at 4. Courts also must economize on
time and deliberative effort, as these, too, come in short supply. Given that courts have short
timeframes for making decisions and must spread their deliberative effort across many cases, a single
case can receive only a fraction of the court's attention. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a
Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal
Courts ofAppeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 403-04, 407-13 (2013) (describing how federal appel-
late judges spread their deliberative efforts across cases, thereby economizing on decision-making re-
sources). As a result, some of the courts' decisions come out erroneous. See Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or
the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 367-69 (1986) (explaining why errors in fact-finding and
applications of the law are inevitable). Our legal system tries to reduce those errors and their net social
cost. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 757-60, 826-31 (explaining how our legal system works to reduce
the net cost of errors in civil and criminal adjudication). To this end, it designed special mechanisms
that include burdens of proof, presumptions, rules of interpretation, and appellate review. Id. at 804
(explaining appellate review as geared toward reduction of errors); STEIN, supra, at 26-27, 124-33,
143-53, 219-25 (analyzing burdens of proof and presumptions); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 593 (1992) (cataloguing and analyzing canons of statutory interpretation and showing how the
Supreme Court uses them to optimize decisions under uncertainty); see also Victoria J. Palacios, Faith
in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases,
49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 315-16 (1996) (attesting that errors are inevitable even in death penalty cases
and that appellate courts can spot only a fraction of those errors); Garrick B. Pursley, Book Review:
Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1365, 1391-92 (2011) (reviewing ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO,
POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (2009)) (explaining that some constitutional interpretive rules are designed
to help courts avoid errors in applying the law); Robert S. Smith, How the Prompt Outcry Rule Pro-
tects the Guilty, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1445, 1445 (2013) (noting a senior New York judge's acknowledgment
that adjudicative errors are inevitable).
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mistaken liability decisions." Courts sometimes assign liability and the
requisite penalty to a faultless party; and in other cases, they exonerate a
party who violated the law. Shortages in the courts' resources-time, ef-
fort, attention, memory, as well as information about facts and law-
make those errors inevitable.5 6 Appellate courts can detect and fix only a
small fraction of those errors.57 Worse yet, appellate judges, too, are
bound to make mistakes."
B. Allocation of Errors Across Claims
Because our courts generally try to avoid errors, we assume
throughout this Article that errors that courts do not manage to avoid
are random rather than skewed. Those errors do not systematically dis-
criminate against or in favor of particular parties and claims. Rather,
they are distributed more or less evenly across parties' talking points. We
believe that this standard probabilistic assumption" is realistic as well.'
We make this assumption for an additional reason: it helps us show that,
even when courts do not favor defendants, our civil liability system puts
defendants ahead of plaintiffs.
Under this system, the numerical imbalance between plaintiffs' and
defendants' talking points makes a big difference. Take a defendant who
raises two standard claims: "I committed no violation; and I also have a
defense that exempts me from liability." Assume that the defendant is
right about both claims, but the court might mistakenly reject them. This
prospect is not good for the defendant. Yet, the fact that the defendant
has two alternative claims, rather than just one, mitigates this prospect
substantially. To defeat the plaintiff's suit, the defendant only needs to
prevent the court from mistakenly denying her one claim out of two. The
defendant's claims thus function as backups for each other. They en-
55. See Alan C. Marco, Learning by Suing: Structural Estimates of Court Errors in Patent Litiga-
tion, (Vassar Coll. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 68, 2006), available at http://economics.vassar.
edu/docs/working-papers/VCEWP68.pdf (calculating that courts find a valid patent invalid twenty to
twenty-five percent of the time, while upholding the validity of an invalid patent in zero to forty per-
cent of the cases).
56. See supra note 54 and sources cited therein.
57. See supra note 54 and sources cited therein; see also Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 13, at
74-79 and studies surveyed therein.
58. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to
Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 893-94 (2012) (observing that appellate courts' decisions
are not error free); see also Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1130-31
(2011) (demonstrating that a sharp increase in appellate courts' docket was followed by a steep decline
in reversals of the appealed decisions). The appellate process is still the most efficient way of correct-
ing lower courts' errors. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379,383-87 (1995).
59. See Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic Foundation of Law and Economics, 105 Nw. U. L.
REV. 199, 218-22 (2011) (explaining the indifference principle that assumes random, rather than bi-
ased, distribution of unknown events).
60. See Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 13, at 73-79, 94 (showing that defendants come out
ahead in both trials and appeals).
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hance the defendant's protection against adjudicative errors and alleviate
her litigation burden.
Consider now a plaintiff who rightfully claims, "the defendant vio-
lated my entitlement." This talking point has no backups or substitutes.
Assume that the plaintiff faces an unscrupulous defendant, who falsely
asserts that he committed no violation and that he is entitled to a defense
that exempts him from liability in any event. Under this set of facts, the
plaintiff would have to litigate twice as hard as the defendant in our pre-
vious example. She would have to avert two potential errors in the
court's decision rather than just one.
Assume further that the court errs twenty percent of the time. The
defendant in our first example will then do reasonably well: her chances
of losing the case undeservedly will amount to only four percent.' The
plaintiff in our second example, on the other hand, will not do well at all:
her chances of being denied her rightful remedy will amount to thirty-six
percent.6 2 The defendant's situation will consequently be nine times bet-
ter than the plaintiff's. The defendant will refuse to increase her settle-
ment payout, relative to the error-free world, by more than four percent.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, will be forced to reduce her reserved
settlement price by thirty-six percent.
Things may get even worse. Assume that courts err only ten percent
of the time, but the defendant asserts three alternative defenses, instead
of two. Under this scenario, the probability that the court will erroneous-
ly deny all of these defenses equals 0.001 (0.1 percent). Meritorious de-
fendants will thus be nearly certain (99.9 percent) to win the case. Con-
sequently, they will be unwilling to pay plaintiffs more than 0.1 percent
of the disputed amount. Meritorious plaintiffs, on the other hand, will
not fare so well. As their chances to prevail on each of the three issues
are seventy-three percent (0.9'), they will discount their settlement prices
by twenty-seven percent (100% - 73%). Meritorious defendants will thus
do 270 times (!!) better than deserving plaintiffs.
This prodefendant bias is profoundly anomalous. As we demon-
strate below in Part III, it allows unscrupulous defendants to extort fa-
vorable settlements from deserving plaintiffs. Facing this prodefendant
bias, plaintiffs would have no choice but to settle the case far below the
expected value of the suit.
Prior to investigating this structural bias and its ill effects, we need
to consider three factors that might alleviate it. One of those factors is
the plaintiffs' power to claim any amount of damages-inflated or even
61. We assume for simplicity that all of the court's errors occur independently of each other. The
defendant's chances of being erroneously denied both claims thus equal 20%x20%=4%. When the
court's errors are not mutually independent, a similar distortion will occur, but its computation would
become more complex.
62. This chance is calculated as follows: 20%+20%-(20%x20%)=36%. The deduction of
(20%x20%=4%) is necessary to avoid double counting of the overlapping chances. See Stein, supra
note 59, at 210-11.
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skyrocketing-in the hopes that the court will award it.6 Arguably, de-
fendants do not have the same opportunity to benefit from courts' errors
in damage assessments because they cannot claim that the plaintiff's
damage is below zero. 4
Another factor is the law's suppression of the product rule. Under
extant law, the plaintiff wins her suit by establishing probabilistic pre-
ponderance (>0.5) for each element of the suit. For example, when a suit
has two elements-breach of contract and damage-the plaintiff will win
it by establishing that the probability of each element is 0.7. Under the
product rule, however, the court should dismiss the suit because its ag-
gregate probability is 0.49 (0.7 x 0.7)-just below the requisite prepon-
derance threshold (0.5). Arguably, the law's suppression of the product
rule gives plaintiffs a benefit not available to defendants.
The third factor is credibility discounting. Arguably, when a de-
fendant raises several defenses instead of presenting a single cohesive
story, the court would not believe him.6 5 We discuss these factors in the
order presented.
In theory, plaintiffs can strategically overstate their damage by any
chosen amount. Defendants, on the other hand, cannot undervalue the
plaintiff's damage below zero dollars. For example, a plaintiff whose ac-
tual damage is $100,000 can claim it to be $1,000,000. By doing so, the
plaintiff will overclaim $900,000 in the hope that the court will mistaken-
ly grant her outlandish demand. The defendant, for her part, cannot ask
the court to reduce the plaintiff's actual damage by $900,000: she can on-
ly claim that the plaintiff sustained no damage whatsoever. The defend-
ant's benefit from the court's error thus cannot exceed $100,000. Argua-
bly, therefore, the plaintiff in this example has a superior overclaiming
opportunity. This opportunity outscores the defendant's by $800,000.
From a purely analytical standpoint, this argument is correct. How-
ever, the extent to which plaintiffs can actually overclaim their damages
is limited by common sense. In contracts, the agreed-upon prices and
market valuations of the exchanged goods place a cognizable limit on
63. The court's authority to award damages may be subject to statutory caps. See DOBBS, supra
note 11, § 384, at 1071-73.
64. Under appropriate circumstances, defendants might be able to file a counterclaim. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 13.
65. See Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v.
Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 929 ("[T]he actual practice of civil litigation encourages the
parties to formulate alternative hypotheses, over which a choice is made ... rather than encouraging
the litigation of elements and their negation . . . ."); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Una-
nimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 201, 212
(2006) ("The deliberations of these 50 cases revealed that jurors actively engaged in debate as they
discussed the evidence and arrived at their verdicts. Consistent with the widely accepted 'story model,'
the jurors attempted to construct plausible accounts of the events that led to the plaintiff's suit. They
evaluated competing accounts and considered alternative explanations for outcomes."); Roger Allan
Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 93-109 (2013) (arguing that,
for most defendants in patent suits, asserting a narrow noninfringement claim while denying the pa-
tent's validity is costly and risky and that defendants consequently prefer to raise noninfringement
claims only); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 292-94 (2013).
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those damages." In torts, compensation recoverable by plaintiffs is
capped by the rules of causation6 7 and foreseeability.68 Therefore, when a
plaintiff puts forward an outlandish demand for compensation, chances
are that the court will deny it. There is virtually no room for error here
(as opposed to cases in which the plaintiff overclaims her damage mod-
erately). As we already explained, courts' errors result from the shortag-
es in information and other decision-making resources. 6 9 Outlandish
compensation demands do not fall into the shortage zone. To properly
evaluate and reject such demands, courts only need common sense, expe-
rience, and a few moments of thought.
Suppression of the product rule is one of the most puzzling legal
phenomena; it has no easy explanation.7 0 For that reason, it provoked an
extensive scholarly debate that will soon mark its fortieth anniversary.
Our law instructs factfinders not to multiply the probabilities attaching to
discrete elements of a lawsuit. 7 2 By doing so, it allows plaintiffs to win
cases upon aggregate probabilities that fall way below fifty percent. 73 As
a consequence-so goes the argument-courts deliver, over a run of cas-
es, more incorrect decisions than correct ones.7 1
66. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, §§ 12.8, at 784-91, 12.9, at 791-96 (outlining basic meas-
urement of contract damages).
67. See DOBBS, supra note 11, H§ 166-69, at 405-12 (outlining causation requirements).
68. Id. § 143, at 334-36 (outlining foreseeability requirement).
69. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 58-62 (1977) (expressing an
original statement and explanation of the product rule's suppression).
71. See STEIN, supra note 54, at 49-56 (analyzing the product rule's suppression and its effect on
factfinding); Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens ofPersuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Ex-
planations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 893-944 (criticizing the deterrence- and Condorcet-based justi-
fications of the product rule's suppression); Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and
the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 571-79 (2013) (explaining adjudicative factfinding as driv-
en primarily by the principle of "inference to the best explanation" that avoids the anomaly associated
with the product rule's suppression); Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122
YALE L.J. 1254, 1258-65 (2013) (developing a comparative-probability approach to burdens of proof
that avoids the product rule altogether); Kevin M. Clermont, Death of Paradox: The Killer Logic Be-
neath the Standards of Proof, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1061-1138 (2013) (using fuzzy logic and
belief functions to explain adjudicative fact-finding and justify the product rule's suppression); Saul
Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 734-45 (2001) (using Condorcet's jury
theorem to justify the product rule's suppression); David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law
of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 34, 38-41 (1979) (arguing that accuracy requires that courts follow the
product rule and other rules of mathematical probability); Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Prob-
ability-The Logic of the Law, 13 O.J.L.S. 457, 457-79 (1993) (same); Ferdinand Schoeman, Cohen on
Inductive Probability and the Law of Evidence, 54 PHIL. Sc. 76, 80-82 (1987) (arguing that courts'
failure to follow the product rule is a mistake); Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two
Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199,
1199-1234 (2001) (justifying the suppression of the product rule on deterrence grounds); Ronald J.
Allen, Book Review: Laudan, Stein, and the Limits of Theorizing About Juridical Proof, 29 L. & PHIL.
195, 225-26 (2010) (unfolding further criticism of the deterrence-based justification of the product
rule's suppression).
72. See Stein, supra note 71, at 1204 n.6 (citing caselaw and pattern jury instructions that sup-
press the product rule).
73. See Kaye, supra note 71, at 38-41.
74. Id. at 41 (arguing that law deviates from probability rules and accepts "imprecision and inac-
curacy" because "other values are at work").
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Whether this argument is correct is a big question that this Article
cannot resolve. Our question here is different: we need to find out
whether the suppression of the product rule offsets the defendants' ad-
vantage in the allocation of courts' errors over the parties' claims.
Ostensibly, the law's suppression of the product rule does exactly
this. Consider again a plaintiff whose suit has two independent elements
with a probability of 0.7 attaching to each. By allowing the plaintiff to
win the suit, the law ignores the fact that the suit's aggregate probabil-
ity-0.49-falls below preponderance.75 By ignoring this probability, the
law does not permit the defendant to aggregate the doubts accompanying
the plaintiff's claims into the probability that one of those claims is false.7 1
Aggregation of these doubts-0.3 for each claim-yields a probability of
0.51 (0.3 + 0.3 - 0.32). This probability is real, but the defendant is not
permitted to use it as a defense. The law consequently appears to benefit
the plaintiff at the defendant's expense.
This appearance, however, is misleading because the law's suppres-
sion of the product rule is symmetrical.77 Defendants, too, have an ex-
emption from this rule, and it is therefore inaccurate to describe it as giv-
ing plaintiffs a one-sided advantage. Take a defendant who invokes the
defense of misrepresentation to counter a breach-of-contract accusation.
To establish this affirmative defense, the defendant must prove that: (1)
the plaintiff misrepresented to her material facts, (2) upon which she was
justified to rely, and (3) this misrepresentation induced her assent to the
contract." Each of those elements must be more probable than not indi-
vidually. There is no requirement that the elements' aggregate probabil-
ity be greater than 0.5 as well. 9 Hence, when each element has a proba-
bility of 0.7, the defendant will establish misrepresentation that entitles
her to rescind the contract. The fact that the elements' aggregate proba-
bility is way below preponderance (0.7 = 0.34) is of no consequence be-
cause-once again-the product rule does not apply. By suppressing this
rule, the law does not permit the plaintiff to aggregate the doubts accom-
75. See id. at 38 (arguing that it is perfectly appropriate for courts to dismiss a suit that has a
0.499 probability of being meritorious).
76. This policy does not always align with efficiency and fairness. See Ariel Porat & Eric A.
Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2, 55-61 (2012).
77. For example, in establishing contributory negligence, the defendant must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed "to exercise care for herself" and that this failure "is
one of the causes of her harm." See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 199, at 485. The defendant must prove
each of those elements in the same way in which plaintiffs must prove elements of negligence. Id.
§§ 198, at 493, 199, at 495-96. See 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 74.16, at 98-104 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
rev. ed. 2001) ("[T]he burden of proving the impossibility defenses rest with the person asserting it ...
that party must prove all elements of the defense .... ).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981).
79. See, e.g., Eng'd Prods. Co. v. Donaldson Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1024-25 (N.D. Iowa 2004)
(holding that the [defendant] "bears the burden of establishing every element of its asserted defense
by a preponderance of the evidence" (citing Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020,
1046 (Fed. Cir. 1992))); Guzman v. Abbott Labs., 59 F. Supp. 2d 747, 763 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (stating that
a defendant in a Title VII action must prove "each element of [its] affirmative defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence of the material undisputed facts" (citing Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 777-78 (1998))).
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panying the misrepresentation defense. Aggregation of those doubts
(1 - 0.7') yields a pretty high probability: 0.66. This probability means
that the defendant's claim of misrepresentation has a sixty-six percent
chance of being wrong somewhere. The plaintiff, however, cannot use
this aggregate probability to her advantage.
We now turn to the credibility-discounting penalty. Presently, this
penalty is not part of our law. On the contrary, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(d)(3) and its state equivalents expressly allow defendants to
"state as many separate ... defenses as [they have] regardless of con-
sistency.""0 Contrary to scholars' projections,"t courts also do not have a
policy of disbelieving defendants who take advantage of this rule. Had
this policy been in place, we would have seen virtually no cases featuring
defendants who assert alternative defenses. 82 Such cases, however, have a
salient presence on our litigation landscape. 3
III. DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS
Adjudicative errors are inevitable, given the scarcity of our courts'
decision-making resources.' All that our system can do on that score is
allocate those errors in a way that aligns with efficiency and fairness. Un-
fortunately, the system does the exact opposite. The civil liability struc-
ture it creates gives defendants more talking points than plaintiffs. As a
result, plaintiffs are bound to suffer more than defendants from the
courts' unintended, but unavoidable, errors. Worse yet, the system allows
defendants to unilaterally dilute the settlement value of the plaintiff's
suit by asserting two or more defenses that backup one another.
Remarkably, defendants also have an impressively long list of de-
fenses to choose from." Our torts system accounts for three general de-
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3).
81. See Ford, supra note 65, at 93-109; Griffin, supra note 65, at 292-94.
82. This policy aligns with our procedural solution of the prodefendant bias problem. See infra
Part IV.A.
83. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 537-47 (5th Cir. 1998) (exemplify-
ing a defendant sued for infringing trademark and trade dress and asserting "functionality," "generi-
cide," "no likelihood of confusion," and "fair use" defenses); Polo v. Shwiff, No. C 12-04461 JSW,
2013 WL 1797671, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013) (exemplifying a breach of contract claim countered
by four alternative defenses: "unclean hands, lack of standing, contractual bar, failure to meet contrac-
tual obligations"); Eng'rd Prods. Co. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 836, 880 n.28 (N.D. Iowa
2001) (exemplifying a defendant in a patent infringement action who asserted laches, estoppel, and
patent invalidity as alternative defenses); see also, e.g., Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir.
2014) (noting multiple defenses raised by defendant); United States ex rel. Ragghianti Founds. III,
LLC v. Peter R. Brown Constr., Inc., No. 8:12-cv-942-T-33MAP, 2014 WL 103457, at *11 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 10, 2014) (same); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Ruch, 940 F. Supp. 2d 338, 340 (E.D. Va. 2013) (same); In
re Sturm, Ruger, & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:09CV1293, 2012 WL 3589610, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 20,
2012) (same); Appling v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 745 F. Supp. 2d 961, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (same);
Crawford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't, No. 06-299-JBC, 2008 WL 4724499, at * 5 (E.D.
Ky. Oct. 23, 2008) (same); Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855, 866-67 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)
(same); Ulichny v. Merton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1042 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (same).
84. See supra note 54 and sources cited therein.
85. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The Law of Financial
Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
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fenses," on top of immunities," and our contract law recognizes ten gen-
eral defenses" as well as some other defenses. 89 The four branches of in-
tellectual property-patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and trade
secrets law-account for thirty-four different defenses." Property law ac-
counts for at least five.9' Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(c)(1) and its state equivalents catalog fourteen defenses that apply
across the board,' while clarifying that the catalog is not exhaustive.93
Meritorious defendants properly take advantage of the opportunity
the law gives them. Unscrupulous defendants, on the other hand, can
misuse that opportunity by extorting cheap settlements from deserving
plaintiffs. Under those settlements, the plaintiff's recovery amount falls
far below the expected value of the suit. Those settlements are manifestly
unfair. They also embolden prospective wrongdoers, who expect to pay
less for their violations of contracts, property, and safety rules. Rational
plaintiffs, nonetheless, have no choice but to accept those settlements.
The prodefendant bias thus robs plaintiffs of their rightful remedies
while encouraging torts, breaches of contract, and other violations. In the
(Andrew Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=2307895 (describing trust law as encompassing "the duty of loyalty doctrine ... alongside
a long list of exceptions and exemptions"); Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five De-
fenses Securities Litigators Need to Know, 62 Bus. LAW. 1281 (2007) (discussing seventy-five (!!) de-
fenses that courts have used to dismiss securities suits).
86. See DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 199, at 494-98,201, at 503-06,203-04, at 510-14, 211, at 534-39
(outlining defenses of contributory/comparative negligence, avoidable consequences, and assumption
of risk).
87. Id. § 260, at 693-95 (outlining governmental and other official immunities against liability in
torts).
88. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, §§ 4.12, at 250-55, 4.15, at 260-64, 4.16, at 264-66, 4.18, at
270-72, 4.20, at 273-76, 4.28, at 307-16, 8.2, at 519-25, 9.2-9.9, at 619-67; see also Miriam A. Cherry, A
Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named "Sue": Using a Disputed Dinosaur to Teach Contract Defenses, 81
N.D. L. REV. 295, 300-07 (2005) (discussing eight general defenses against contractual liability: unilat-
eral mistake, unconscionability, fraud, misrepresentation, conditions, economic duress, undue influ-
ence, and ability to sell, to which one should add impossibility and frustration of purpose).
89. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ragghianti Founds. III, LLC v. Peter R. Brown Constr., Inc.,
No. 8:12-cv-942-T-33MAP, 2014 WL 103457, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2014) (listing "(1) Prior
Breach; (2) Payment; (3) Conversion of Termination for Default; (4) Setoff; (5) Estoppel; (6) Failure
to Mitigate; and (7) Barment" as defenses asserted against breach-of-contract allegations).
90. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1512. In intellectual property litigation, howev-
er, plaintiffs still have the upper hand. Their economies of scale and ability to target weak defendants
give them substantial advantage in court. See id. at 1512-20; Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The
Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1345-52 (2012).
91. These defenses include license, easement, necessity, de minimis, and abandonment. See
Morton J. Horwitz, Conceptualizing the Right of Access to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REV. 105, 115-16
(2004) (attesting that "even the most absolute-sounding subject of trespass to land can be shown to be
riddled with exceptions ... in the forms of public easements or the defense of necessity"); Christopher
M. Newman, A License Is Not a "Contract Not to Sue": Disentangling Property and Contract in the
Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1114-15 (2013) (outlining elements of license in
real and intellectual property); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. 1823, 1850-52 (2009) (discussing de minimis and necessity defenses in property law).
92. These defenses include accord and satisfaction; arbitration and award; duress; estoppel;
fraud; illegality; laches; license; payment; release; res judicata; statute of frauds; statute of limitations;
and waiver. Four additional defenses listed by this rule-assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
and injury by a fellow servant-belong to the law of torts.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) refers to "any avoidance or affirmative defense, including" the subse-
quently listed defenses.
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remainder of this Part, we outline these distortionary effects and then
proceed to examine whether they can be mitigated by parties' contract-
ing. We show that sticky defaults and high transaction costs render the
contracting solution ineffectual.
A. Unfairness
The prodefendant bias engenders two kinds of unfairness: class un-
fairness and inter partes unfairness. The system's inferior treatment of
plaintiffs as a group in its distribution of talking points and courts' errors
constitutes class unfairness. Inter partes unfairness, on the other hand,
occurs on the individual case level. This unfairness is present when an
unscrupulous defendant extorts a cheap settlement from a deserving
plaintiff.
Our system can remedy both kinds of unfairness in two ways. The
first way is equalizing up: The system can enhance the plaintiffs' protec-
tion against courts' errors by making it similar to the defendants' protec-
tion. The second way is equalizing down: The system can downscale the
defendants' protection against courts' errors to the plaintiffs' level."
These two measures are codependent. By enhancing the plaintiffs' pro-
tection against courts' errors, the system will necessarily reduce the de-
fendants' protection. By the same token, when the system downscales the
defendants' protection against courts' errors, it enhances the same pro-
tection for plaintiffs.
For that reason, the system will do well to synchronize the available
equalizing measures. Our reform proposals in Part IV go along this path.
B. Distortion of Primary Behavior
When plaintiffs sharply discount their settlement prices, they reduce
the penalties that wrongdoers expect to incur. This penalty reduction
makes the wrongdoers' deterrence suboptimal. When a wrongdoer's ex-
pected payout goes down by thirty-six percent, as in our introductory ex-
ample, the wrongdoer will intensify his damaging activity by thirty-six
percent. More precisely, a wrongdoer who pays nothing for inflicting an
additional $360,000 damage on another person will go ahead and inflict
that damage in order to generate any profit for himself. From a rational
wrongdoer's standpoint, this profit may be as low as one dollar.
This consequence is socially harmful if not downright devastating.
From a social welfare perspective, a person should only be allowed to
cause a $360,000 damage when he generates a net benefit that exceeds
$360,000. When a person's activity generates no benefit, it should not be
undertaken. By condoning such activities, our system puts itself on a path
of a steady and significant erosion of social welfare.
94. Cf Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303 (1988)
(advocating downward equalization of parties' litigation opportunities).
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C. Can Contracting Help?
Arguably, the prodefendant bias identified in this Article is a prob-
lem for torts, but not for contracts. Contract law permits parties to modi-
fy the default rules as they deem fit. Based on that permission, parties
can replace the violation/defenses system and its distribution of talking
points by a different arrangement that best promotes their interests.
We believe that this argument is only partially correct. We can cer-
tainly think of business agreements that substitute the violation/defenses
system by a different liability arrangement. For example, parties may
stipulate in their agreement that certain defenses will not be available at
all. Alternatively, parties may set up strict evidentiary requirements or
other conditions for granting exemptions from the duty to perform the
agreement.
For many contracts, however, this default-altering possibility is un-
realistic. Many defenses recognized by our contract law are "sticky de-
faults."5 Altering them will often involve negative signaling and substan-
tial transaction costs. For example, when a party negotiating an
agreement proposes to contract away "impossibility" or a similar de-
fense, the party on the other side of the table may suspect trickery, which
would either kill the deal or open up collateral negotiations in advance
over the terms on which the defense will be forfeited. Anticipating this
development, the party interested in the removal of the defense may de-
cide to give up the idea entirely.96
IV. SOLUTIONS
This Part of the Article develops three alternative solutions to the
prodefendant bias problem. We call these solutions procedural, compen-
satory, and substantive. These solutions are geared toward the same goal:
Each solution tries to eliminate the prodefendant bias and to equalize
the parties' risks of losing the case undeservedly. We discuss the proce-
dural solution first and then move on to introduce and evaluate the com-
pensatory and substantive solutions.
A. Procedural Solution
The procedural solution eliminates the parties' power to pursue al-
ternative claims. This solution sets up a "one-to-one" format of litigation
95. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032 (2012) (unfolding general economic theory of sticky defaults); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky De-
faults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 386-96 (2007) (explaining and illus-
trating sticky defaults in corporate law).
96. See Ayres, supra note 95, at 2084-88 (explaining the sticky-default dynamic); Omri Ben-
Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2006)
(explaining how negative-signaling prospects make contract defaults sticky); cf Lauren E. Willis,
When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1201 (2013) (showing that consumer-
protecting defaults are not sticky enough as profit driven firms move consumers out of those defaults).
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that allows defendants to assert and develop only one defense for every
cause of action stated by the plaintiff. To operationalize this solution,
policymakers would have to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(d)(3) and its state equivalents. Presently, these rules allow defendants
to rely on alternative defenses, regardless of consistency. On paper,
plaintiffs have the same procedural power, as they, too, are allowed to
assert alternative claims. However, the causes of action available to
plaintiffs-negligence, breach of contract, violation of a property right,
and so forth-are vastly outnumbered by defenses available to defend-
ants. Against each cause of action asserted by the plaintiff, the defendant
may raise two or more defenses." The power to assert alternative defens-
es consequently enhances the defendants' protection against courts' er-
rors at the plaintiffs' expense."
Under the current liability system, defendants have many defenses
to choose from.9 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1) itemizes some
of those defenses, while notifying defendants about defenses that must
be pled affirmatively. Defenses listed in this rule, in alphabetical order,
include: accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of
risk, contributory negligence, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration,
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, re-
lease, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver."w
To these general defenses, defendants can add many specialized defenses
that apply in tort, contract, property, and intellectual property cases."o'
Consider a defendant who falsely asserts three defenses that she
chose from the list. The plaintiff knows that the defendant is trying to
cheat, but she also estimates that the cheating might succeed because
courts sometimes err. The plaintiff finds out that courts make erroneous
decisions in determining violations and defenses only three percent of
the time. This discovery is good news for the plaintiff. However, it comes
along with a piece of not-so-good news. By raising three alternative de-
fenses, the defendant has tripled her chances of winning the case due to
the court's error. The plaintiff has a ninety-seven percent chance to pre-
vail on each of the three defense issues,"0 which means that her chances
of winning the entire case are ninety-one percent (0.97'). The defendant's
chances of winning the case have gone up from three percent to nine
percent due to a sheer accumulation of false defenses. The defendant
thus enabled herself to extort an additional six percent of the plaintiff's
money in a settlement agreement-an extortion that may yield her a
nonnegligible sum at the plaintiff's expense. Worse yet, the defendant
97. See cases cited supra note 83.
98. See supra Part II.B.
99. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1).
101. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
102. As previously mentioned, we assume that these defenses are independent of each other and
have no overlapping elements.
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may even be able to improve her position further by adding more alter-
native defenses to her list.
Policymakers may try to attenuate this problem by reducing the in-
cidence of adjudicative errors. For example, they may codify courts'
precedents, redraft ambiguous statutes into clear ones, and set up proce-
dures that make adjudicative factfinding more meticulous than it is pres-
ently. Policymakers also may reduce the courts' caseload by hiring more
judges. Additionally, they may grant awards and promotions to judges
who generate the largest number of verdicts with the smallest number of
appeals."'
These measures, however, are pricey. Worse yet, they are unlikely
to bring about a substantial reduction in a rate of error that is already as
low as three percent. Finally and most importantly, even when policy-
makers manage to cut the error rate by, say, two-thirds, unscrupulous de-
fendants would still be able to undo this accomplishment by asserting
more defenses than previously; and, as we have already noted, they have
a very long list of defenses to choose from.
To see how this could happen, assume that the error rate goes down
dramatically, all the way to one percent. Take a dishonest defendant who
falsely raises four alternative defenses backed by perjury and fake docu-
ments."0 By claiming these defenses, the defendant increases his chances
of winning the case undeservedly to four percent (1 - 0.994). His phony
assertion of four defenses thus quadruples his initial one percent chance
of winning the case undeservedly. This strategy allows the defendant to
extort from the plaintiff four percent of the claimed amount. When this
amount is $1,000,000, the defendant would be able to force the plaintiff
to agree to a $960,000 settlement. Allowing unscrupulous defendants to
pocket $40,000 by a strike of a pen is hardly a good idea. For that reason,
policymakers will do well to abandon their ambitious courtwork-
improvement agenda. Instead of implementing this costly agenda, they
should try to eliminate the defendants' opportunity to exploit courts' er-
rors.
To achieve this goal, policymakers should eliminate the defendants'
power to assert and develop alternative lines of defense. The resulting
"one-to-one" format of civil litigation would equalize the parties' talking
points. As a result, courts' errors would be distributed more or less
equally across plaintiffs' and defendants' claims. This equalization would
103. The award system has two potential drawbacks. As an initial matter, it impedes the devel-
opment of expertise by making judges less willing to specialize in effort intensive areas of the law. Sec-
ond, and perhaps counterintuitively, judges who deliver plainly mistaken decisions may generate
smaller appeal rates than judges who make smaller errors, as parties will often recognize an indefensi-
ble error and settle the case without an appeal. Smaller errors, on the other hand, create divergent
expectations about the appellate court's decision. These divergent expectations reduce the prospect of
settlement and drive parties to the appellate court. See generally Marin K. Levy et al., The Costs of
Judging Judges by the Numbers, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 313 (2010) (expressing skepticism about
quantitative rankings of judicial performance).
104. We assume once again that these defenses are independent of each other and have no over-
lapping elements.
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disarm dishonest defendants who would no longer be able to extort
cheap settlements from plaintiffs through accumulation of phony defens-
es. This disarmament is the principal advantage of our procedural solu-
tion.
Unfortunately, this solution also has a serious shortcoming: its im-
plementation will affect honest and dishonest defendants indiscriminate-
ly. By denying dishonest defendants an opportunity to cheat, the proce-
dural solution will undoubtedly benefit the legal system. At the same
time, however, it will also limit the honest defendants' opportunity to
properly defend themselves against unmeritorious suits. Oftentimes, de-
fendants litigating in good faith are unable to predict the course that
their trials will take. 05 For that reason, they cannot commit themselves in
advance to a single line of defense and forego all other defenses. These
defendants need the flexibility provided by the extant law that allows
parties to assert alternative claims." As Professor Clarence Morris put it
more than seven decades ago, "[t]he function of this flexibility is avoid-
ance of procedural mistrials. Careful lawyers cannot always foresee what
will happen."'" Our procedural solution will take away this flexibility. By
doing so, it will force rightful defendants to gamble on the defense they
will put on trial. This gambling will produce undeserving winners on the
plaintiffs' side and undeserving losers on the defendants' side.
B. Compensatory Solution
The compensatory solution introduces an adjustable damage multi-
plier to equalize the parties' trial prospects and level the playfield for set-
tlements.10s This multiplier will offset the difference between the plain-
tiff's and the defendant's exposures to the prospect of adjudicative error.
To achieve this result, the multiplier should be set at 1/(1-E)", with
E representing the percentage of the court's erroneous decisions on vio-
lations and defenses, and n being the number of defenses that the de-
fendant chooses to raise in the case at bar." Under this formula, any de-
fense that the defendant chooses to assert will increase her probability of
105. This unpredictability was among the reasons underlying Learned Hand's famous remark, "as
a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death." Learned
Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL ToPics
89, 105 (1926).
106. This need has been acknowledged by Justice White in his dissent in Mathews v. United States,
485 U.S. 58, 70 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) ("There is a valuable purpose served by having civil liti-
gants plead alternative defenses which may be legally inconsistent. Allowing a tort defendant to claim
both that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, but that if he did, he met that duty, preserves possi-
ble alternative defenses under which the defendant is entitled to relief. It prevents formalities of plead-
ings, or rigid application of legal doctrines, from standing in the way of the equitable resolution of a
civil dispute.").
107. Clarence Morris, Jury Trial Under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 TEx. L. REV.
427,428 (1942).
108. For a classic account of damage multipliers, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Puni-
tive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998).
109. For a deserving plaintiff, the expected judgment without a multiplier equals (1-E)' x J. With
the multiplier, it would equal (1-E)' x 1/(1-E)' x J = J.
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defeating the plaintiff, but, at the same time, it will also increase the
compensation amount that she would pay the plaintiff if the court rejects
all of her defenses. The defendant would consequently have to choose
the desired tradeoff. By deciding how many defenses she would raise, the
defendant would set up the multiplier for her own case. The defendant's
choice would then be pervasively affected, if not dictated, by the merit of
her defenses. This system would deny defendants the opportunity to
erode the settlement value of the plaintiff's suit by simply adding more
defenses.
As we demonstrate below, the proposed multiplier would not dis-
courage rightful defendants from raising and developing alternative de-
fenses. Because a defendant only needs one good defense to defeat the
suit, these defendants would still be able to minimize their exposure to
adjudicative errors by asserting multiple defenses. For unmeritorious de-
fendants, however, this strategy would no longer be advantageous be-
cause it would boost their expected payout.
To see how this system works, revisit our hypothetical case in which
the defendant presents two alternative defenses to a court that errs twen-
ty percent of the time. As we already explained, if the defendant is right
about both defenses, her chances of undeservedly losing the case due to
the court's error would equal four percent. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff pursues a rightful claim and the defenses asserted by the de-
fendant are false, the plaintiff's chances of being denied the remedy she
deserves would equal thirty-six percent. Under the proposed formula, if
the plaintiff wins the case, she would recover 156.25 percent of her actual
damage (1/80%2). When that damage is $1,000,000 and the court rejects
both defenses, the plaintiff will thus receive $1,562,500. The dishonest de-
fendant's probability of being forced to pay this amount to the plaintiff is
sixty-four percent (100% - 36%). Consequently, the defendant will agree
to a settlement obligating her to pay the plaintiff $1,000,000 (64% x
$1,562,500)-the exact recovery amount that the plaintiff deserves.
Consider now a meritorious defendant who asserts two alternative
defenses and consequently has a four percent chance of losing the case
undeservedly. For any such defendant, the maximal settlement payout
moves up from $40,000 (4% x $1,000,000) to $62,500 (4% x $1,562,500).
The net error effect for rightful defendants thus increases from four per-
cent to six percent ($62,500/$1,000,000).
This modest increase is fully justified. If the defendant were to as-
sert only one defense, the plaintiff's recovery would not have exceeded
$1 million but then the defendant's risk of losing the case undeservedly
would have stayed at twenty percent instead of going down. Under the
multiplier system, by adding an alternative defense to her pleading, the
defendant takes this risk down to six percent. Absent the multiplier, the
defendant's addition of that defense could reduce the risk to four per-
cent, but then the rightful plaintiff's exposure to a similar risk would be
thirty-six percent instead of zero percent. Hence, by increasing the right-
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ful defendants' risk of losing the case by only two percent, our multiplier
reduces a similar risk for deserving plaintiffs by thirty-six percent (from
thirty-six percent to zero percent). This is an unquestionably good
tradeoff from both fairness and utility perspectives, especially since de-
fendants always have more talking points at their disposal than plaintiffs.
What we have said thus far makes the compensatory solution very
attractive. This solution, however, has a serious shortcoming as well. The
adjustable damage multiplier can boost plaintiffs' compensation into mil-
lions of dollars. This boost would allow unscrupulous plaintiffs to extort
handsome settlement payments from defendants. For example, when the
multiplier ups the plaintiff's compensation to $10 million a one percent
error rate for rightful defendants would assign the expected value of
$100,000 to a completely unmeritorious suit. Consequently, the plaintiff's
ability to file and litigate such a suit at any cost below $100,000 would
make it worth her while to give it a try. For a defendant who is not only
meritorious, but rational as well, the best course of action would then be
to pay the plaintiff $100,000 for the suit's removal.
The compensatory solution also has an enforcement limit. Many li-
able defendants will not pay plaintiffs large compensatory awards be-
cause they do not have the money. These defendants, consequently, will
not be afraid to assert as many defenses as they desire. The damage mul-
tiplier idea originates from Gary Becker's classic insight about the en-
forcement of criminal law under scarce resources."o According to Beck-
er, when a government experiences drawbacks in enforcing criminal law,
it would do well to magnify its penalties instead of intensifying enforce-
ment efforts."' That is, instead of extinguishing society's resources on
apprehending and punishing criminals, the government can achieve the
same level of deterrence by a strike of a pen: all it needs to do is boost
criminal penalties.1 1 2
Becker's insight works extremely well with a criminal law that can
viably threaten violators with imprisonment and other harsh penalties."
Individuals who commit torts and default on contracts, however, do not
go to jail for their actions. Becker's insight consequently does not work
well with these individuals. Becker's punishment method derives its vital-
ity from the fact that only a few people can become punishment proof.
Carrying it over to the civil liability contexts, in which people become
110. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
179-80 (1968) (developing a classic economic model of deterrence under scarce resources that make it
impossible for the government to punish all violators of the law).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 180-84.
113. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 281 ("If the costs of collecting fines are assumed to be zero
regardless of the size of the fine, the most efficient combination is a probability arbitrarily close to zero
and a fine arbitrarily close to infinity .... [E]very increase in the size of the fine is costless, while every
corresponding decrease in the probability of apprehension and conviction, designed to offset the in-
crease in the fine and so maintain a constant expected punishment cost, reduces the costs of enforce-
ment-to the vanishing point if the probability of apprehension and conviction is reduced arbitrarily
close to zero.").
No. 3] 1281
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
judgment proof and pay nothing for their misdeeds, may prove to be a
serious mistake.114
Damage multipliers have other shortcomings as well. Facing the risk
of paying plaintiffs large sums of money, potential defendants might de-
cide to steer away from activities that expose them to the prospect of be-
ing sued. Many of those activities are socially beneficial. Their abandon-
ment would therefore be detrimental to society's welfare."' Another
shortcoming is an increase in the cost and duration of settlement negotia-
tions and trials."' With all this in mind, we now turn to discuss our sub-
stantive solution to the problem at hand.
C. Substantive Solution
Our substantive solution consolidates all defenses against liability
into a single comparative fault defense (without changing anything in the
procedural defenses against suit that include limitations, laches, and im-
munities"'). Under the consolidated comparative fault defense, courts
will assess each party's fault in her interactions with the other party.
Ranging between zero percent and one hundred percent, this assessment
will determine the amount that the defendant will pay the plaintiff for
the alleged tort or breach of contract. Under this framework, each party
will be free to make any claim as to how to quantify her opponent's fault
relative to hers. Parties will consequently bring to court an equal number
of claims, which will secure equal allocation of the courts' errors across
those claims.
The comparative fault system will also soften the consequences of
courts' errors, as those errors will obliterate only a fraction of the deserv-
114. Note that punitive damages are generally not dischargeable in bankruptcy. See Jendusa-
Nicolai v. Larsen, 677 F.3d 320, 322-24 (7th Cir. 2012). They are, however, dischargeable at death. See
Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135,139 (Ind. 2005).
115. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 108, at 879 (observing that "if damages exceed harm,
firms might be led to take socially excessive precautions").
116. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Re-
form Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 639 (1998) (showing that higher monetary stakes "are
associated with significantly higher total lawyer work hours, significantly higher lawyer work hours on
discovery, and significantly longer time to disposition"); see also Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empiri-
cal Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 525, 531 (1998) (finding that the duration and costs of litigation strongly correlate with the
stakes).
117. These defenses are immunities against suit granted for reasons extraneous to liability. See
Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) ("Statutes of limitation, like
the equitable doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by prevent-
ing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that
the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."); see also
POSNER, supra note 12, at 807 (explaining that "the purpose of the statute of limitations is to reduce
the error costs associated with the use of stale evidence").
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ing party's entitlement." Furthermore, by breaking the viola-
tion/defenses dichotomy, the comparative fault system will also alter the
nature of courts' errors. Under this system, when a court fails to see that
the defendant is fully responsible for the plaintiff's damage and errone-
ously assigns a fraction of that damage to the plaintiff, the assigned frac-
tion is unlikely to be substantial. It would only be substantial under the
improbable scenario in which the court commits another error by mis-
evaluating the severity of each party's fault. For the same reason, when a
court erroneously decides that a completely faultless defendant was at
fault, it would likely not hold that defendant responsible for a large frac-
tion of the plaintiff's damage."'
The substantive solution works particularly well with contract law
and the law of torts. These two branches of the law regulate interactions
between two or more actors that give each actor an opportunity for self-
enrichment at another actor's expense. Under the contracts framework,
this opportunity encompasses breach, deception, and exploitation of an-
other party's mistake. Under the torts framework, it includes externaliza-
tion of harm, on one side, and moral hazard, on the other side. When left
to their own devices, prospective injurers will carry out self-enriching
risky activities without taking precautions against harm to another per-
son, even when those precautions are inexpensive. Conversely, when a
prospective victim is guaranteed full compensation for her damage, she
might decide not to make even a minimal effort at avoiding that damage.
Contract law and the law of torts try to suppress opportunistic be-
havior of all parties involved.120 To this end, they use fault as their core
criterion for imposing and apportioning liability for damages.12 ' Both
frameworks also utilize monetary payouts as a primary means for reme-
diating wrongs and discouraging misconduct.'2 2
Fault, bilaterality, and monetary remediation guarantee nearly per-
fect alignment between our substantive solution and the existing contract
and tort doctrines. Our substantive solution seamlessly integrates into
118. Cf Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159 (1983) (advocating probability-based recovery for civil
trials to shield parties against undeserved large losses).
119. See also infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
120. See SHAVELL, supra note 27, at 182-90 (explaining that the torts system must use compara-
tive fault criteria to eliminate free riding and induce socially optimal precautions against harm); id. at
297-99 (explaining that contract rules and enforcement are needed to reduce parties' opportunities for
opportunistically taking advantage of each other); see also DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 1, at 2-3, 9, at 16
(describing tort liability as predominantly fault-based); Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in
Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1397 (2009) (articulating and advancing a comparative fault metric
for determining contracting parties' responsibilities).
121. See SHAVELL, supra note 27, at 182-90.
122. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 377, at 1047-53 (outlining monetary remediation under the law
of torts); FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 12.8, at 757-64 (attesting that monetary compensation is the
principal remedy for breach of contract); see also Miller v. LeSea Broad., Inc., 87 F.3d 224, 230 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("The normal remedy for breach of contract is an award of damages. Specific performance
is exceptional.. .. "),
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these doctrines. Policymakers, therefore, can implement it and achieve
equality in the allocation of courts' errors at a relatively low cost.
Implementing this solution outside the contract and tort areas, how-
ever, is not always a good idea. Many areas of the law do not include
fault, bilaterality, and monetary remediation among their defining char-
acteristics. For those areas, the procedural or compensatory solution may
be more appropriate than the substantive solution. Consider a child cus-
tody dispute and assume that both parents have defaulted on their paren-
tal obligations. The mother, with whom the child lives, failed to place the
child in the appropriate school program, thereby violating a court-
approved custody agreement between the parents. The father, for his
part, did not come to court to complain about the violation and allowed
it to continue for over a year. Based on these facts, the court apportions
seventy-five percent of the fault to the mother and the remaining twenty-
five percent to the father.
Would it then be a good idea to let the child live with her father
from January first through September thirtieth (seventy-five percent of
the year), and then move her to live with her mother from October first
through December thirty-first (twenty-five percent of the year)? We do
not think so. Our family law does not think so either: it mandates that
courts use benefit of the child as a sole criterion for adjudicating custody
disputes. 12 3 The child custody doctrine has building blocks other than
fault, bilaterality, and monetary remediation.
Note, however, that this doctrine still has the same viola-
tion/defenses architecture as our contract and tort doctrines. For exam-
ple, in our hypothetical child custody dispute, the mother may be able to
exonerate herself not only by showing that her daughter's school pro-
gram was adequate, but also by establishing that her temporary financial
hardship-or, alternatively, illness from which she now had recovered-
did not allow her to secure the agreed-upon school placement.1 24 The
mother's ability to develop alternative defenses vastly improves her posi-
tion in the allocation of the court's errors. The father's exposure to those
errors, on the other hand, increases exponentially. How should the legal
system equalize the parties' exposure to those errors?
As we just saw, the child custody doctrine does not tolerate the sub-
stantive solution. Can this doctrine work together with the compensatory
solution? We believe that this combination would not be successful ei-
ther. Forcing the mother to pay any substantial amount to the child's fa-
ther would give the father a windfall at the child's expense. Forcing the
mother to pay this amount to a fund that will be used by the child would
123. Allen M. Bailey, Prioritizing Child Safety as the Prime Best-Interest Factor, 47 FAM. L.Q. 35,
35 (2013) ("In making child custody decisions, family court judges must apply their jurisdiction's 'best
interests of the child' criteria.").
124. See, e.g., Mona Lewandowski, Barred from Bankruptcy: Recently Incarcerated Debtors in and
Outside Bankruptcy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 244-45 (2010) (attesting that most states
recognize financial hardship of a parent as a ground for allowing him to modify child support duties).
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not accomplish anything: the child would not have more money as a re-
sult of that transfer.12 This simple analysis leaves only one solution at our
disposal: the procedural solution.
The procedural solution would be the best fit for the child custody
doctrine. Under this doctrine, the child's benefit is of paramount im-
portance, which makes it imperative for the parents to investigate and
familiarize themselves with all relevant facts before they come to court.
For that reason, it would be entirely sensible, if not mandatory, to pro-
hibit alternative pleadings in this area of family law. Each parent should
be required to come to court with only one cohesive account of the rele-
vant events.126
Finally, consider a landowner seeking a court order that will enjoin
a trespasser and obligate her to pay compensation for the unlawful occu-
pation of the landowner's land. Because trespassers are not supposed to
acquire shares (or other entitlements) in the occupied land, our substan-
tive solution is not suitable for trespass cases. Trespass cases require res-
toration of property rights. For this type of cases, policymakers therefore
should choose between the procedural and compensatory solutions. The
procedural solution does not seem to work well in the trespass context.
Denying the alleged trespasser an opportunity to raise alternative de-
fenses may be too harsh as well as detrimental to society's interest. For
example, the alleged trespasser should be allowed to claim that her use
of the owner's property fell within public easement or, alternatively, that
it amounted to a de minimis, and hence noncompensable, infringement
of the owner's rights.1 27
In the present example, therefore, the compensatory solution domi-
nates the other two solutions. This solution also aligns with the property
doctrine that protects the owner's right to exclude by obligating trespass-
ers to pay aggravated damages rather than rentals.'"
V. CONCLUSION
Policymakers make laws in the hope that courts will implement
them properly. This hope is hard to reconcile with the real world in
which courts sometimes misapply the law, misinterpret evidence, and de-
cide the case wrongly. Insulated from that world, our rules of civil liabil-
ity systematically malfunction. By pitting several defenses against every
single violation, they give defendants an undeserved talking points ad-
vantage over plaintiffs. Under these rules, a court's approval of one de-
125. Cf Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 48 (Ariz. 1995) (recognizing that parental immuni-
ty against tort liability prevents vain money transfers within the family, yet deciding to repeal the im-
munity on the theory that a child will only sue her parent when the parent has liability insurance).
126. This requirement aligns with the conventional story-based model of factfinding. See sources
cited supra note 65.
127. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 91, at 1833-34, 1850-51 (identifying circumstances in
which trespass will be excused as de minimis).
128. Id. at 1841-45 (justifying imposition of punitive damages on encroachers).
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fense of many enables the defendant to defeat the plaintiff. On the other
hand, when a court erroneously strikes one defense, it might still keep
the defendant out of harm's way by granting her another defense. This
inequality puts plaintiffs on a hurdle race track while allowing defendants
to sprint.
We have offered three alternative solutions to this problem. These
solutions-procedural, compensatory, and substantive-are directed to-
ward the same goal: eradicating the defendants' unfair talking points ad-
vantage. Our procedural solution allows defendants to develop only one
line of defense against each claim asserted by the plaintiff. Our compen-
satory solution introduces a damage multiplier for defendants who lose
the case. This multiplier increases the compensation duty for liable de-
fendants in proportion to the number of defenses they choose to raise.
Our substantive solution replaces the violation/defenses system with a
comprehensive comparative fault regime. This regime would authorize
courts to apportion parties' responsibility for damages and unperformed
agreements correspondingly to their faults that range between zero and
one hundred percent. Under this regime, each party would be free to as-
sert and develop any number of claims about how her fault measures
against her opponent's fault. We have shown that this solution dominates
the other two in tort and contracts areas where individuals' entitlements
and obligations are bilateral, fault-based, and monetized. For differently
structured obligations and entitlements, we recommend the procedural
and compensatory solutions.
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